Is Now the Time to Leave Afghanistan?

Osama bin Laden is dead. Is now the right time to leave Afghanistan?

I ask because I think the decision to keep troops in Afghanistan has been agonizing for many Canadians and Americans. I have argued with people in both of my homes about whether our troops should still be there, almost ten years after invading.

The reasons to leave are powerful. The human cost of the mission is terribly high, both in terms of Western troops/aid workers and Afghan victims of the war. The financial and political costs are high, too. And it's debatable how much good we're doing in terms of 'nation building' or even preventing future terrorist attacks.

But I have usually argued that, on balance, there were still sufficiently good reasons to stay. Simply put, the job wasn't finished: Osama bin Laden was still at large, the Taliban were still awful, and running away would have given the jihadis greater scope to commit evil.

Does bin Laden's death change that equation? I'm not sure, but it's certainly possible. Until now, one of the real costs of leaving was the image of NATO cutting and running when the going got tough. With Osama dead, there is now a window of time open in which NATO could leave Afghanistan with its head held high. It would still be a mistake to say 'mission accomplished', given all the wreckage of Afghanistan and the turmoil that is likely to accompany NATO's departure, but Osama's death is a tangible victory to show for NATO's efforts.

Of course, Osama bin Laden's death is probably more symbolic than a real blow to al Qaeda's operations. I don't want to equate Osama's death with victory over terrorism. Still, it's a major milestone.

And I emphasize that it is really a window of time. If NATO continues major combat operations in Afghanistan for a significant period of time even after Osama is dead, the window will close.

Now is the time to think hard about the rationale for the operation. I'd love to hear what others think. Is now the time to leave Afghanistan?

Libya unfolding

For over 40 years, Muammar Qadhafi has had a way of surprising the world. This time, the surprise is on him. His people are rising against him.

As I write, the government is reported to have lost control of Benghazi, Libya's second city, and much of the eastern part of the country along with it. Still, Benghazi has long been a site of anti-Qadhafi protests, so it was even more remarkable that the protests reached the capital, Tripoli, a few days ago.

Qadhafi wasn't the only one surprised. Recently I noted that the oil-rich autocrats in the Middle East had a firm hand on power, even with turmoil in oil-poor states Egypt and Tunisia. But now the protests have spread to Bahrain, Algeria and especially Libya. (Bahrain isn't oil-rich but tends to act like a petrostate because of subsidies from Saudi Arabia.)

I should have noted the fact that petrostates have not one but two characteristics that are relevant for current events. On one hand, oil gives incumbents political power, so incumbent leaders remain in office far longer than in non-petrostates (Africa's longest leader until recently was the president of oil-rich Gabon; when he died in office after 43 years in office, Qadhafi became Africa's longest serving leader). On the other hand, oil tends to weaken political institutions in petrostates (through patronage and corruption), meaning that they also have a higher proclivity towards civil wars than non-petrostates: think Nigeria, Angola, Algeria. This creates an odd paradox: is oil a force for stability or instability? Political scientists are still working that one out -- and clearly the debate is not just theoretical.

For the time being, let me just draw attention to two differences between Libya and Egypt or Tunisia. First, Libya has oil. Second, Libya has Qadhafi. Both of these are going to make the confrontation in Libya a good deal more bloody than its counterparts in Egypt and Tunisia.

Libya's oil money allows Qadhafi to afford an extensive security apparatus, and a patronage network for a hard core of regime supporters. It also allows him to hire foreign mercenaries to fight the protesters, in the event that some or all of the Libyans in his army defect. All of these things make it harder for the protesters, and violence more likely. There is even the possibility that the protesters might be able to get foreign mercenaries of their own, drawn by the promise of oil money once the government has been toppled.

Libya also has Qadhafi, and he is no Mubarak. Mubarak was personally corrupt and clearly enriched himself at the expense of his people. Qadhafi is a megalomaniac. Characteristically, he said yesterday on Libyan television: “Muammar Qaddafi is history, resistance, liberty, glory, revolution.” This is a man for whom being the "Brother Leader" is central to his identity, not just a means to get rich. That makes him even harder to dislodge.

Qadhafi's son, Seif, promised 'rivers of blood' in the event of a civil war. Civil wars are rarely if ever won on the battlefield. It is the loyalty of the armed forces that usually determine the outcome, as it did in Egypt. The loyalty of Libya's armed forces is already showing cracks and strain. Still, it has not yet broken, and even if it does, Qadhafi might have enough mercenaries to make up the difference.

The outcome of the Libyan struggle is far from certain, but I fear the prospect of 'rivers of blood' looms mightily.

Governance in the Middle East

Across the Middle East, common people are standing up to their governments in protest even as I write. This demonstration of resolve for self-governance, in protest of corruption, tyranny, and repression, is nothing short of inspiring.

Of course, the outcome of these protests is still far from clear. Democracy and good governance is far from certain, even if the current autocrats are ousted from power. And even if democracy does emerge, it will need a combination of great leadership and great luck to stabilize and take root.

Still, these protests are an opportunity the likes of which has not been seen in decades.

Being a scholar of global oil politics, I cannot help pointing out which countries are experiencing these opportunities, and which ones are not. Tunisia and Egypt, which have relatively little oil, have had the most significant protests; their oil-rich neighbors Libya and Algeria have not. The leaders in Jordan, Syria, and Yemen have been shaken; the monarchs in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the other Gulf states have not. What's the common denominator? The oil-rich autocrats have a firm hand on power; the states with little or no oil are experiencing popular protests of far greater magnitude.

There are exceptions, of course: the government in oil-rich Iraq has also been shaken by the outbreak of protests. But then, I think it is fair to say that Iraq is exceptional in a lot of ways, and stability was not its strong suit even before the protests in Tunisia.

At the risk of only moderate simplification, the lesson ought to be clear: so long as the global economy remains dependent on oil, it continues to fund autocracy in the Middle East.

Energy and climate security

The US Congress is currently considering multiple bills on climate change and energy security. In December, the world will meet in Copenhagen to consider a framework for a post-Kyoto agreement. Perhaps it is time we had a serious discussion about what these issues mean for US national security.

Environmentalists often point to climate change as the source for all manner of ills, including the destruction of Pacific Islands and low-lying coastal areas, massive immigration issues in South Asia, and perhaps even war. There may be a grain of truth to these claims, but they seem distant from the average American voter. Let's focus instead on three issues that are clear and present dangers from America's current energy and climate policies.

First, there is the full cost of America's oil dependence. As the global economy shows signs of recovery, the price of oil has quietly crept above $70 a barrel, a price far above the historic trend. Indeed, the recent collapse in investment in the oil sector means that oil prices could continue to rise. Follow the money: America is sending more than $500 billion a year overseas to oil-exporting countries. Most of those countries have autocratic political systems that are unprepared to handle that kind of financial influx. Oil money often turns into military spending and advanced weaponry, which in turn leads to civil and international war. Ironically, this costs America even more money in the long-run, as it spends billions on the military to try to maintain "stability" in oil-exporting regions.

Second, there is the full cost of doing nothing about climate change. The US Navy has hundreds of concrete piers around the world that are likely to be submerged by rising seawater, and the cost to replace them is estimated at $100 billion. Insurance companies will raise premiums for natural disasters. The government will spend millions developing early-warning systems and mitigation systems in light of more frequent hurricanes like Katrina and Gustav. These are just a few examples of the costs climate change will impose on the public. Whenever some pundit complains about the cost of environmental policies, remember the implicit price tag of doing nothing.

Third, there is the real but unquantifiable risk of catastrophic climate change. The single biggest risk is that the ocean currents will change, diverting the warm Gulf current from the North Atlantic and bringing a rapid ice age to Europe. If this sounds like the stuff of Hollywood, well, it is, but it is also a significant risk that has been highlighted by the UN International Panel on Climate Change. This risk is real, and it is a threat to the US military in two ways. First, chaos in Europe would threaten many of America's most important allies, not to mention the thousands of US troops posted in Germany and elsewhere. Second, this sort of disruption in Europe would destabilize the US-Russia relationship in ways that are impossible to predict.

You don't have to be a tree-hugger or a radical hawk to see energy and climate change as serious issues of US national security. It's time to see these issues as a statesman would: from a bipartisan, long-term perspective. Obama's move to increase the gas-mileage was a good first step, but more is needed. It will take decades to convert the capital stock of US power plants into cleaner, more efficient technology, even if the right policy incentives were put in place today. To make that happen, the US needs to see the issue not just as an environmental problem, but also a security imperative.

But have hope. Far-sighted politicians are starting to watch for the first moment when the words "carbon tax" become politically palatable. It will pay to be out front on this issue.

Iran's questionable election

While it is hardly clear who really won in Iran's election last Friday, one thing is clear: the clerics are still firmly in control of the regime. Whether they remain so depends largely on how they handle the present protests.

Optimists in the West hoped that hardliner Ahmedinejad would be replace by the kinder, gentler Moussavi as President. There are two big problems with that notion. First, Moussavi is no teddy bear. He was the militant Prime Minister who guided Iran through the Iran-Iraq war, in which the use of waves of boy-minesweepers was one of one of Iran's favored tactics.

Second, even if Moussavi were the Iranian version of Gandhi, it isn't clear how much of a difference it would make. The President is not the most powerful person in Iran: that's the job of the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. The President is probably not even the second most powerful, or the third, or the fourth -- those are all occupied by the unelected clerics in Khamenei's inner circle, and those who run the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.

Don't get me wrong, if Moussavi were elected, that would be (have been?) better than Ahmedinejad. But I'm not sure that it was ever really that important who was President.

Paradoxically, the real question is how the clerics handle the aftermath of this election. If they do as they have done twice before when faced with calls for reform (in 1999 and 2000), and send in the military, they may have a real problem. They could end up legitimizing their opponents and strengthening an underground resistance. (Of course, this isn't guaranteed: the Chinese roled out the tanks in 1989 and got away with it.)

If instead the clerics give ground, perhaps even by declaring fraud by Ahmedinejad and giving Moussavi the Presidency, they will likely strengthen their own long-run position. The reason for this is simple: Moussavi is highly unlikely to be able to get anything done once in office. Khamenei can veto anything he really doesn't like, and there are more subtle ways of derailing reforms. Giving the reformers hope and then strangling it slowly with Iran's infamous bureaucracy is likely a far, far more effective tactic for the clerics.

Either way, let's hope the clerics screw it up. It is high time for reform in Iran.

International: Blood and oil in Chad

Violence is spreading in Chad as rebels attack the capital. The flow of blood is, unfortunately, all too connected to the flow of oil.

In 2003, Chad became a significant oil exporter thanks to the World Bank-sponsored Chad-Cameroon pipeline. The World Bank stipulated restrictions on how the oil money could be used, but of course once the pipeline was built, the Chadian government as a lot less willing to follow the rules.

Chad's neighbours do not give us much hope for responsible leadership. North of Chad, Qaddhafi has ruled Libya for almost 40 years, where he has used oil money to sponsor violence around the world. To the East, Sudan is a major oil-exporter and, not coincidentally, embroiled in a genocide in Darfur.

Why does this seem to happen in oil-exporting countries? There are two basic reasons.

First, oil erodes the legitimacy of government. The oil industry is famously corrupt, perhaps second only to the global arms trade in terms of bribes paid and officials bought off. Along with corruption, oil money usually brings economic mismanagement and government incompetence. In a desparately poor country like Chad, this all adds up to a highly unpopular government that lacks any real legitimacy. That opens up the door to extreme, revolutionary leaders who are little interested in ruling the country for the good of the public.

Second, oil income is highly concentrated. This makes a successful revolution potentially very profitable: if the rebels can seize control of the government, they seize control of a very lucrative oil business. High stakes attracts big sharks: again, radical leaders.

How should the internatoinal community respond to the situation in Chad, and oil-exporters elsewhere? Well I'm working on that -- I'll let you know when my dissertation is finished. But the logical starting point is that countries should at least avoid doing harm.

This is what France appears to have done over the last 3-5 years: it has continued to back the President of Chad, even as his people have turned against him. Doing so has robbed France of any legitimacy in the eyes of the people, greatly reducing its ability to help re-establish peace. The international community has simply got to learn the lesson that continues to haunt the global arena: backing a unpopular and illegitimate but compliant dictator might work in the short-run, but it frequently comes back to bite us in the rear-end -- with disastrous consequences.

International: Pyrric success in Bali

You have to hand it to the Bush administration: the US is getting world-wide acclaim for the "success" of the Bali global climate change talks, and it cost them nothing.

In one deft move, the US snapped up the label of the magnanimous "compromiser" at Bali. Initially opposed to the proposed agreement, the US delegation did a U-turn and gave its support to the proposed agreement.

But what is this agreement, exactly? It's not a Kyoto-style set of emissions targets, of course. There's no way Bush's core constituency could accept that. It's not even a promise to negotiate binding targets. Its an agreement to talk about undefined targets, and maybe make even make those targets binding. Moreover, the deadline for those talks isn't until the end of 2009 -- well after Bush leaves office.

Instead, it was the greens (mostly the EU) that did all the compromising. There is no agreement to make the emissions targets for industrialized countries binding, and there's no agreement for the developing countries like China and India to do much of anything.

Still, perhaps the Bali conference was not a total failure. It contributes to the long, slow struggle to get the world's attention and build the political will to take real actions to reduce climate change. For now, the best the international community can do is talk about voluntary targets, but that doesn't mean we have to settle for this at home. We can, and should, urge our national and local governments to accept binding targets, even in the absence of a real international agreement.

International: When Syria comes to dinner

Syria announced this week that, contrary to expectations, it would attend the meeting on Arab-Israeli conflict hosted by the US in Annapolis at the end of November. This could be a chance for a step forward in the peace process, if it were seized correctly.

It is not clear that Syria has ever actually been interested in peace with Israel. Having a foreign enemy serves a useful purpose for the Ba'athist regime: it gives them a scapegoat on which to blame any and all troubles faced by the Syrian people.

But one crucial thing has changed in Syria: its oil is running out. In 2007, for the first time in recent history, Syria became a net oil importer. This has significant consequences: income from oil exports have long been a crucial source of revenue for the Syrian government, and rather suddenly they have lost it -- just as oil prices are skyrocketing.

So why is this an opportunity? The loss of oil revenues means that the Syrian government is desparately looking for a way to balance its books. The first time the US was able to create peace between Israel and one of its neighbors, Egypt, it did so by offering massive side payments to an Arab state in need of revenues. Now Syria falls in the same camp: maybe, just maybe, it could be tempted to offer a lasting peace in exchange for a new source of funding for its cash-strapped government.

This is not to argue that the Syrian regime is either pleasant or trustworthy. Granted, there is a certain stench associated with American payments to a Ba'athist dictatorship. Maybe the best thing to do is to hope that the Ba'athist regime runs into so much trouble that it gets overthrown by its own people, and replaced by a regime more interested in peace. But opportunities to create peace in the Middle East do not come everyday, and the US should think twice before throwing it away.

International: Pakistan, ripe for revolution

It is always dangerous to make political predictions, and never more so than when one considers rare events like revolutions. Nonetheless, there is good reason to believe that revolution is coming to Pakistan, and it may be coming soon.

Pakistan today bears an uncanny resemblence to Iran in the 1970s. In those days, Iran was ruled by an unpopular autocrat, the Shah Pahlavi, who so alienated his people that he was replaced by an Islamic leader, the Ayatollah Khomeini. Today, Pakistan is ruled by an unpopular autocrat, General Musharraf, and is powerfully resisted by local Islamists.

The United States gave significant military and econmoic aid to the Shah of Iran because it wanted Iran's help in facing down its greatest military threat of the time, the Soviet Union. Iranians felt like they were being used as a pawn of the US, and Islamist leaders used this resentment to unite the Iranian opposition. Today, the US gives enormous aid to Pakistan because it wants Musharraf's help in facing down its current military bete noire, Al Qaeda. Predictably, this US support to Musharraf's regime is resented by Pakistanis, and Islamist leaders are using this resentment to give common goals to the opposition.

The Shah's Iran was an infamously corrupt and wasteful regime. Musharraf's regime is so corrupt that it ranks 142 out of 163 on the Transparency International's corruption index, tied with such countries as Angola, Nigeria, and just a fraction ahead of Iraq. This endemic corruption and regime failure created, in Iran, such widespread frustration that eventually the Iranian military withdrew its support for the Shah. For the moment, Musharraf remains in uniform as the head of the military -- and no wonder he is so reluctant to step down from the post.

The parallel between the Shah's Iran and Musharraf's Pakistan is deep but not universal; it should not be taken too far. There are big differences between the two, not least the importance of oil in Iran's economy and its absence in Pakistan's. Moreover, even a perfect analogy would leave room for individual choice and actions; perhaps there is no Pakistani equivalent to the Ayatollah. Still, the parallels are sufficiently striking that we ought to pay attention to at least one key factor in the coming months.

Revolutions are often violent affairs, but they are not decided on the battlefield. They are decided politically, which is why the army is so crucial; if Musharraf loses moral and political legitimacy, the military may withdraw its support, and the regime will fall. When considering the future of Musharraf's regime -- and, by extention, the future of the fight against Al Qaeda -- all eyes should be on Pakistan's military.

International: Al Gore, the failed prophet?

The science of global climate change first came to be discussed seriously in 1987. First it was met with skepticism, then real debate, and now widespread acceptance. Alas, 20 years on, it is breathtaking that we have made almost no tangible progress towards stopping the damage to our planet.

Perhaps I'm being too harsh. After all, a scientific consensus has been forged; the Kyoto treaty was ratified by some and put it into force; a few regional cap-and-trade markets have been launched; and there has been a lot of technical learning. This all adds up, yes. But when it comes to actually reducing our global emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG), or even slowing the rate of growth, our accomplishments are painfully modest.

We're just not getting it done.

With due respect to the engineers and economists, I don't believe the really tricky part about reducing emissions is going to be in the technical details. The hardest challenge is going to be in building the political will to pay the price of reducing emissions. Even with the best technological advances one can realistically hope for, it seems clear that we face real tradeoffs between economic growth and environmental sustainability. We have to make those choices wisely.

Al Gore was the first major US politician to recognize the importance of this issue, and in the last few years he is finally reaping some of the rewards for that far-sightedness. He deserves the credit, and I applaud him for his efforts. But Gore proved in 2000 that while brilliant, he is not the most gifted of communicators. I can't help feeling that there is an eerie similarity between him and another great political mind, Sir Edward Grey.


Sir Edward Grey was the British Foreign Secretary at the start of World War I. He held the position for 11 years, the longest continuous holder of the office ever. As the War approached, he was one of the few men who could see clearly the unfolding tragedy, and one of the most dedicated to peace. Yet that vision, even in a Foreign Secretary, did not translate into the ability to stop the war. Here's what Wikipedia says about him:

"His attempts to mediate the dispute between Austria-Hungary and Serbia by a "Stop in Belgrade" came to nothing due to the tepid German response. He also failed to clearly communicate to Germany that a breach of the treaty not merely to respect but to protect the neutrality of Belgium - of which both Britain and Germany were signatories - would cause Britain to declare war against Germany. When he finally did make such communication German forces were already massed at the Belgian border and the German High Command convinced Kaiser Wilhelm II it was too late to change the plan of attack."

When Grey finally got his message through, it was too late to stop the threat. Sound familiar?

I hope Al Gore is not the modern incarnation Grey. I hope that leaders will listen to his message. I hope that more gifted political entrepreneurs, especially in the US, will take up his mission and create an opening for real change. I hope that leaders in China and India start to see sustainability as a common goal to which they must contribute. I hope the public in the West gives support to politicians who propose meaningful environmental action.

Maybe Gore can get black and white results. But I fear Gore is just too much Grey.